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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the Hierarchical Market Economy (HME) category does not provide 
an adequate starting point for addressing capitalist diversity in Latin America. Building from 
a critical perspective on the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) and Global Production 
Network (GPN) approaches it will instead consider the impact of firms’ transnational 
relations and the often neglected role of working class struggles. It will argue that capitalist 
diversity can only be understood at the nexus of these ostensibly global and local 
phenomena. By specifying the strategic decisions taken by firms in Argentina’s automobile 
industry, it will account for the failure of this sector. I will also examine the role of working 
class struggles in the industry in Córdoba, Argentina, arguing that these were vital in 
shaping the specific and unstable form of capitalist diversity in Argentina, as well as 
potential alternatives to it. 
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Introduction1 
 
The Hierarchical Market Economy (HME) category for Latin American political economies 
represents the most recent and successful extension of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
framework (Schneider, 2009; Schneider and Soskice, 2009; Friel, 2011). It claims that the 
region should be understood as one that is characterised by the hierarchical coordination of 
economic activity by transnational corporations (TNCs) and economic grupos within a 
liberal regulatory environment. Two problems with this position will be presented in this 
paper. Firstly, it fails to adequately capture the determinants of firm behaviour by 
marginalising the global interconnectedness of production and exchange networks. 
Secondly, in privileging the agency of firms it obscures the struggles of workers within and 
against these structures and the unstable forms of capitalism that this produces. 
Via this critique, the first section of this paper will develop a critical perspective on the 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) and Global Production Network (GPN) approaches (Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Dicken, 2011). On the one hand, it will be argued that the GCC/GPN 
framework contributes significantly to going beyond the HME category by offering an 
interpretation of firm behaviour that adequately considers the impact of their transnational 
relations. On the other hand, it will be argued that going beneath the HME category requires 
a more substantive engagement with those actors that are often neglected or marginalised 
by ‘firm-centrism’ (Selwyn, 2012). Working class conflict must be incorporated into the 
analysis of specific sectors and their transnational production networks, for workers’ 
political interests and the conflicts that arise around them produce unstable forms of 
capitalism that tend to be reified in firm-centric accounts of both the HME and orthodox 
GCC and GPN literatures. 
To concretise this theoretical critique, the second section of the article will examine 
Argentina’s automobile industry during its most rapid period of development in the 1960s 
and 1970s, focusing on the city of Córdoba. This case addresses three important aspects of 
the theoretical argument: the sector is an example of a hierarchically ordered and ‘failed’ 
experience of economic development that HME scholars emphasise; it has always been 
highly dependent upon the global firms and technology that GCC/GPN concentrate on; and 
it was an important arena of worker militancy (see also Bailey and Shibata in this special 
issue on contestation). TNC investment decisions were induced by both national policy 
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incentives and imperatives derived from their structural position in the global economy. 
Workers then mobilised to contest these decisions, particularly over new productive and 
managerial discipline. This combination of global competitive pressures and the conflicts 
they induced left the automobile industry in Córdoba fragmented and internationally 
uncompetitive, but also as a site for the emergence of potential alternatives to this particular 
form of industrial capitalism. 
 
 
Going beyond and beneath: A critique of the HME category 
 
The rise of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach in the last ten years has successfully 
countered the prominent notion of global capitalist convergence. Since Hall and Soskice 
(2001) launched the approach as a coherent set of theoretical and empirical propositions, 
studies reinforcing the claims of continued divergence in Western capitalist countries have 
proliferated. Complex matrices of domestic institutions are shown to form part of an 
iterative process whereby corporate strategies are shaped in response to the opportunities 
arising from particular regulatory environments. Such corporate strategies are then claimed 
to reinforce and reproduce distinctive forms of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 14-17; 
Schneider and Soskice, 2009: 33). The importance ascribed to the state in constructing these 
institutional environments offers an antidote to efforts to minimise its economic role, but 
for advocates of this approach the most significant economic actor in maintaining 
divergence is the firm. The positive reception received by this framework has encouraged its 
extension beyond the original focus on the Anglo-Saxon Liberal Market Economy (LME) and 
the continental European Coordinated Market Economy (CME). The most successful of 
these extensions has been Ben Ross Schneider’s characterisation of the Latin American 
Hierarchical Market Economy (HME). As such, the HME category, and the VoC approach it 
is based upon, is the key point of reference for this article’s critical engagement with 
comparative capitalisms (CC) research, although other perspectives will also be briefly 
discussed.  
In defining the HME it is argued that, unlike in LMEs and CMEs, firm strategies and 
relations in Latin America are coordinated primarily by hierarchy as a default preference 
(Schneider, 2009: 18). The prominence of TNCs and large diversified business grupos means 
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hierarchy is built into inter-firm relations and corporate governance structures of Latin 
American enterprises. These entities are the key conduits for access to capital, technology 
and markets and so can continually reproduce the hierarchical relationships that sustain 
them. Hierarchy also facilitates the weakening of broad-based labour movements and 
consolidation of asymmetric bargaining. This tendency then reproduces low levels of 
investment in skills and training and the informal, low-skilled character of the HME (ibid.: 
5-13; Schneider and Soskice, 2009: 33-41). The HME is then posited as an inefficient form of 
socioeconomic organisation that hinders economic development, reproduced by 
hierarchical economic relations and the predominantly liberal institutional environment.2 
The approach, however, has been strongly critiqued as ahistorical, methodologically 
nationalist, and firm-centric (Ebenau, 2012: 211-216). Firstly, it is argued that in limiting 
change to a narrow path-dependency model, HME over-emphasises historical continuity. It 
is a static ‘snapshot’ of Latin America that is projected as both cause and consequence of the 
present predicament. Radical changes in the region throughout the 20th century and long-
run historical processes are not adequately incorporated into the framework, leaving little 
analysis of the ‘default to hierarchy’ as contested social practice. Secondly, emphasising 
national institutions reinforces this stability, for this conceals the effect of institutional 
changes at both a sub- and transnational level. Instead, it is argued that the national level, 
whilst still important, is but one element of the ‘multiscalar’ environment upon which an 
understanding of capitalist diversity must rest. The HME appears as as a self-contained and 
self-explanatory model, in which actors and institutions within the relatively closed national 
political economy reproduce and reinforce the contemporary form. Finally, it is argued that 
by focusing primarily upon the constitutive power of firms, the state and labour are reduced 
to little more than bystanders in the face of corporate strategy.  
Whilst reincorporating the state is important, this article will focus on extending this 
critique of firm-centrism to better understand the activity of firms and the constitutive role 
of labour. First, even on its own terms, HME fails to adequately explain the role of firms in 
constructing and reproducing hierarchy. The notion that hierarchy is a ‘default preference’ 
for powerful actors conceals the important determinants of agency that make this so. Whilst 
proponents of HME do acknowledge the global nature of TNCs, firm behaviour remains 
determined by the prevailing national institutional context. Decisions to relocate 
investment in technology and skills are seen primarily as intended to reproduce hierarchy, 
rather than being linked to strategies responding to global competition. Secondly, whilst the 
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TNCs and the grupos upon which HME proponents focus are undeniably powerful actors, 
they are not alone. For example, Schneider (2009: 1-2) argues that he moves away from 
traditional academic concerns on Latin America by incorporating labour relations and 
worker training. Yet in the HME category there is an emphasis primarily upon the weakness 
of workers and trade unions (ibid.: 10-11). His concern is clearly with the impact of hierarchy 
on labour relations, rather than on the agency of workers in contesting and constituting 
economic relations more broadly. 
To address some of these weaknesses that pervade both the HME and VoC approaches, 
Wolfgang Streeck (2009) argues that an understanding of institutional change and 
development must ‘bring capitalism back in’. He argues for ‘a dynamic theory of social order 
free of teleological determinism and linear progressivism’, in which the relative power 
differentials between different actors are acknowledged in the contested and unstable 
manifestations of capitalist diversity (ibid.: 29). This dynamic understanding of the tensions 
and fragility of institutions opens space for bringing the conflicts endemic within capitalism 
to the fore in understanding the form that market institutions come to take and the 
practices actors come to follow. In a similar vein, Marino Regini (2006) and Ronald Dore 
(2006) come to the conclusion that the VoC approach fails to address the contested 
character of institutional formation. For the former, the failure to acknowledge the 
conflicted past and constant renegotiation of institutional constructs is at the heart of this 
weakness (Regini, 2006: 611). For the latter, it is the ‘excessive economism’ that creates 
problems for understanding aspects of social life that influence institutional formation: 
social interaction, conflict generated around the outcomes of various institutional forms, 
and the ideological interpretation of change and its meaning (Dore, 2006: 605-6).  
These authors offer a view, rooted in broader CC discussions and debates, that brings to 
the fore the contested social processes of institutional change. Yet whilst they take an 
important step, they continue to reproduce the marginalisation of actors beyond and 
beneath national institutional configurations (see also Gough in this special issue). On the 
one hand, TNCs and their practices emanating from the global market are not adequately 
addressed, and, on the other hand, the importance of workers as salient political actors 
remains obscured beneath the institutional constructs that prevail. By emphasising the 
relatively closed space of national institutions there is a failure to address the influence of 
interconnectedness within the global political economy. Such a position sustains the 
proposition that hierarchy is a default preference and conceals deliberate strategic decisions 
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shaped by transnational relations of production and exchange. In moving beyond the HME 
the GCC/GPN approach offers an alternative explanation of capitalist diversity through ‘a 
network-based, organizational approach to studying the dynamics of global industries’ (Bair, 
2005: 158). Economic activity is argued to be shaped by global relations in terms of what is 
produced, where it is produced, how it is governed, and the prevailing international, 
national and local policy regimes. The earliest formalisation of such an approach was GCC, 
which emphasised the disaggregation of production and the global networks under which it 
was organised (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). This initial position has evolved from more 
‘traditional’ economic sociology approaches emphasising production to culturalist 
understandings that explore the importance of consumption in shaping contemporary 
capitalism (Bernstein and Campling, 2006: 415-17). What has been consistent, however, is 
the rejection of the national political economy as the main unit of analysis. 
In the GPN approach exemplified by Peter Dicken’s Global Shift (2011), it is argued that 
global production networks must be viewed as both interrupting and being interrupted by 
the politically bounded spaces in which they come to be located. Global networks shape 
economic relations in the locations they are embedded, but they cannot be detached from 
the local political and historical contexts they encounter as part of an interrelated circuit 
(ibid.: 54-7). Firm behaviour is shaped by these multiple, but interrelated, scales of activity: 
for example, TNCs, whilst acting as the main coordinators of the ‘geoeconomy’ (ibid.: 60-2), 
take decisions based on the imperatives emanating from the various sites of regulation and 
from the economic relations in which they are embedded locally, nationally and, most 
importantly, globally. 
It is also argued that the formation of these GPNs is necessarily contested. They are not 
simply ‘technical-economic mechanisms of production and exchange’, but rather areas of 
conflict and collaboration where economic and political actors struggle over economic 
outcomes (ibid.: 59-60). In these terms, Dicken (2011: 63-4) acknowledges that labour must 
be considered as more than a ‘dehumanized factor of production’. Yet by emphasising the 
stark asymmetry between TNCs and organised labour, both politically and geographically, 
he tends to return to a firm-centric approach in practice. This raises the challenge of how to 
‘reinsert the “slices” identified…into the larger entities from which they are extracted’ 
(Bernstein and Campling, 2006: 444). That is, how to locate specific sectors of the economy 
within the struggles innate to global capitalism. Recent critical GCC literature has begun to 
argue that it must be a priority to incorporate the struggles of labour into any understanding 
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of particular experiences of capitalist development (Selwyn, 2012; Cumbers et al., 2008). It is 
not enough to simply explicate the impacts that various production regimes and economic 
relations have on labour or to reproduce the political asymmetries between firms and 
workers. What must also be investigated is ‘how action by labour may co-determine 
processes of local capitalist development’ (Selwyn, 2012: 217; original emphasis). In failing to 
acknowledge the importance of workers for the constitution of capitalist diversity, TNCs 
tend to be over-privileged at the expense of understanding the nexus at which the practices 
of global firms come to be transformed within locally contested relations of production. 
It is the contention of this paper that to understand the instability of capitalist diversity it 
is necessary to go beneath firm-centrism in order to explore how workers contest and 
constitute particular forms of capitalism (see also Hürtgen in this special issue). E.P. 
Thompson (1980) argued that to understand the ‘making’ of a working class, the concrete 
situations of social life had to be interpreted through the perceptions and the experiences of 
workers as constituted by everyday social interactions and historical memory. The worker 
must also remain a constitutive part of a political economy that produces and reproduces 
social relations experienced collectively as a class. Rather than being understood as merely 
pursuing their own interests, they should be understood as influential in generating conflict 
around the practices and institutions of capitalism that they face. 
The insights of Lebowitz (2003) are particularly useful in taking such an argument 
further. He argues that it is not enough to simply posit that the working class can be 
understood in its relation to capital. Workers are not homogenous in their experiences of 
production, in the social struggles that they pursue, nor in the identities that they come to 
form. But equally, the working class should not be reduced to a heterogeneous collection of 
individuals. Whilst contingency and historical specificity are integral to any adequate 
understanding of the concrete political interests of workers, these interests must also be 
linked to the ongoing development and transformation of capitalist social relations, and of 
workers that come to constitute a politically salient working class in diverse and contested 
contexts. Understanding working class struggles within and against global capitalism 
through workers’ experiences and contested identities provides a starting point for 
understanding how they may shape capitalist diversity in Latin America. 
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Towards deeper diversity: TNCs, working class conflict and the 
automobile industry in Argentina 
 
By the 1970s the automobile industry in Argentina was dominated by TNCs and riven by 
fragmentation, obsolete technology, high costs and prices, and increasingly intense social 
conflicts. This section will explore how this came about (see also Ebenau in this special issue 
for more recent years). Firstly, it will be argued that fragmentation, high costs and backward 
technologies were the result of TNC competitive strategies that responded to constraints 
and opportunities offered by the global economy and national economic policy. Secondly, it 
will demonstrate the constitutive role played by one fraction of the working class: workers in 
the automobile industry in Córdoba. Workers active in the modern automobile sector were 
unique in their experiences of work at the time, as they were employed by large TNCs with 
access to the most advanced technology (Nofal, 1989: 98). They also represented one of the 
most active and radical segments of the working class in the city. They held a structural 
advantage vis-á-vis other fractions of the working class through the close living proximity 
and shared workplace experiences that gave them a distinctive and unified identity 
(Brennan, 1996: 294; Brennan, 1994: 43). By exploring this nexus between work, conflict and 
the formation of political interests, it will be argued that only by looking beyond and 
beneath can we understand the unstable and contested nature of capitalist diversity in Latin 
America. 
 
 
TNCs and the automobile industry in Argentina3  
 
The early and ongoing involvement of TNCs in the automobile industry has had an 
important effect on Argentina’s automobile industry. Prior to 1930, Ford, General Motors 
and Chrysler accounted for over 95 per cent of vehicle sales in the country, whilst suppliers 
such as international tyre manufacturers also entered the market throughout the early 1930s 
(Nofal, 1989: 9-12). Despite many foreign firms leaving following the rise to power of Perón 
in 1946, by 1951 he too was pursuing measures to further incentivise foreign investment in 
the sector. Alongside the continuation of assembly operations, some commercial vehicle 
production began with Mercedes and the state-owned IAME, but this remained below 
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50,000 units per annum (Jenkins, 1984a: 41-4). After 1959, TNCs and their home governments 
increasingly lobbied for a ‘good’ climate for foreign firms, premised on the argument that 
fewer restrictions on machinery imports and foreign investment would increase technical 
efficiency (Jenkins, 1984b: 58). Global competition from the recovery of Japan and Europe 
had encouraged strategic moves into the markets of Latin America from weaker firms such 
as Kaiser, Mercedes-Benz and Fiat, as they sought to manufacture price-inflated goods 
behind domestic tariff barriers (ibid.: 53-4; Guillen, 2001: 4). As a result, automobile 
production in Argentina soared. The annual manufacture of cars alone, for example, grew 
from 18,290 to 153,047 units between 1959 and 1969 (Jenkins, 1977: 290). The loosening of 
foreign investment regulations and increasing global competition meant TNCs gradually 
consolidated their control over this growing, but technologically backward and fragmented, 
network of international and local automobile firms. 
Firms’ investments occurred behind tariff walls, allowing them to secure competitive 
advantage and maximise profits with limited technology and capital investment. The return 
of larger firms such as Ford, General Motors and Chrysler led to a new competitive strategy 
emerging with the rapid and deliberate expansion of the range of models being produced by 
individual firms (Jenkins, 1984b: 61). Not only did this further the fragmentation of the 
industry, but it also limited the possibility for economies of scale in a market with low 
demand. Factories were, on average, 10-15 per cent of the size of those in the Global North, 
with less automated production and much higher degrees of vertical integration (Katz and 
Kosacoff, 1989: 54). Technological backwardness was reinforced by the continued 
dominance of TNCs over production networks. For example, contracts for ‘technology 
transfer’ prevented ‘learning by doing’ through restrictions on the purchase of intermediate 
and capital goods and by specifying particular suppliers (Nofal, 1989: 156-157). Much of this 
technology transfer, moreover, was simply imports of second-hand plant and equipment. A 
1967 study found that almost a quarter of machinery in use was more than 10 years old 
(Jenkins, 1984a: 52). Yet despite this fragmentation and technological backwardness, TNCs 
secured substantial profits from their affiliates, receiving, for example, substantially more 
from intra-firm sales of parts and components than was made in direct foreign investment 
and capital contributions (Nofal, 1989: 147). Whilst technology, economies of scale and work 
organisation remained behind those of establishments located in the Global North, profits 
remained high for the TNCs operating across the country. 
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This was no more apparent than in the parts and components sector. Relatively high local 
content requirements had remained in place despite the opening up of the industry during 
the 1960s and 1970s. International component manufacturers could only continue to supply 
the subsidiaries of their customers if they too were located within the national borders. As a 
result, by 1972 there were 2000 parts firms, of which 74 foreign-owned companies accounted 
for 52.2 per cent of production and 50.4 per cent of internal sales (ibid.: 47). This should 
have brought new technology and production methods into this crucial sector as foreign and 
local producers entered into competition. Yet TNC control limited this, as subsidiaries and 
the component manufacturers that followed them did not import modern technologies and 
international best practice. Local component suppliers became trapped in a cycle of 
inefficient production, as they were incorporated as sub-contractors producing to blueprints 
provided by these TNCs (Jenkins, 1984b: 68). The proliferation of model types and 
producing firms meant component manufacturers were subjected to rapidly changing 
product requirements, as the fragmentation and proliferation of suppliers was actively 
encouraged ‘as an offensive strategy to heighten competition among them and to gain 
greater bargaining power over prices’ (Nofal, 1989: 38). They were then either driven out of 
the market or kept as small-scale producers, increasing the fragmentation and high-cost of 
the industry, as well as the profits accruing to TNCs. 
 
 
Working class conflict in Córdoba and beyond  
 
Work in Argentina’s automobile plants was characterised by simplified and repetitive tasks, 
reminiscent of Fordist automated production, but on a slower work cycle due to older 
obsolete tools and more manual handling (Nofal, 1989: 90). A ‘proto-Taylorist’ system was 
established in which technological and organisational elements of work were oriented 
toward discipline and control (Catalano and Novick, 1998: 32). In Córdoba, this form of 
automobile production was implanted by two global firms: IKA and FIAT. The increasingly 
harsh discipline led these workplaces to become important sites of industrial conflict. 
Despite the relatively advanced technology, the slower and more manual nature of work 
required high numbers of unskilled workers, including many recent rural migrants exposed 
to mass production practices for the first time (Brennan, 1994: 90-1; Gordillo, 1991: 167). 
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Shopfloor tensions were intensified by the impersonal demands of modern production that 
were strictly imposed by authoritarian foremen (Brennan, 1994: 314-16). These working and 
managerial practices inscribed a specific identity upon the newly urbanised workers in 
Córdoba, producing combative relations between worker and employer. 
The unions representing these workers were not constrained within the corporatist legacy 
of Perónism.4 Rather than one union representing the bargaining of the entire sector, TNCs 
attempted to weaken worker representation by lobbying successfully for a ‘one union per 
company’ policy (Catalano and Novick, 1998: 29). Ostensibly this provided greater strength 
to the companies by fragmenting the workers, but this fragmentation allowed for a more 
autonomous political identity (ibid.: 33). A distinctive class identity then came to be formed 
in the factories and neighbourhoods of the automobile industry in Córdoba as they engaged 
with leftist political parties, student groups and local intellectuals (Brennan and Gordillo, 
2008: 28).5 Discipline and fragmentation had induced a socialising counter-tendency 
whereby workers were bound together by their relatively similar experiences inside and 
outside the factories, enabling growing ideological and material resistance. This resistance 
first came to a head in 1969 with the cordobazo, in which the most active and organised 
elements of this protest were workers from the large automobile plants. Not only was the 
military government targeted, but also the TNCs that were strongly perceived as their 
exploiters (Brennan, 1994: 140, 151-3). Longstanding Perónist concerns over the economic 
advance of labour were thus reinterpreted within the more open political spaces of 
Córdoba’s trade unions. Resistance to disciplinary working practices and attempts to lower 
labour costs were combined with radical discourses of anti-imperialism and combative class 
politics. 
Increasingly combative union leaders became prominent in the city and challenged 
industrial policy and practice, particularly following trade union electoral victories for leftist 
currents during the 1970s (Gordillo, 1999: 401-2). Attempts to convince the union leadership 
to pacify workers who had risen against the regime in both the cordobazo and its repeat in 
1971 – the viborazo – continually failed.6 A meeting of dissident unions in 1971, both Perónist 
and clasista, proposed a program of nationalisation of key economic sectors, central 
planning, worker participation and the reversal of both rationalisation and the liberalisation 
of foreign investment. By 1972, the regional branch of the CGT in Córdoba was articulating a 
vision of national development that had moved towards the idea of an anti-imperialist and 
‘national’ form of socialism (Brennan and Gordillo, 2008: 154). Moreover, despite the 
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continued latent support for Perón during these years of conflict, industrial workers 
launched the most widespread and militant protests following his electoral victory in 1973, 
with factory occupations occurring throughout Argentina (Brennan, 1994: 243-5).  And by 
1975, informal coordinating committees emerged that linked militants across automobile 
plants in a nascent grassroots movement stemming from the ongoing conflicts and seeking 
to displace the traditional union leadership (Evans et al., 1984: 154). The formative conflicts 
leading up to and following the cordobazo produced a radicalised and politically salient 
working class, with automobile workers in the city at the fore. Politicised experiences of 
industrial work were imbued with a historically-situated meaning that motivated and 
justified political mobilisation, shaping capitalist diversity in Córdoba and in Argentina. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The HME category does not adequately capture the contested and unstable nature of 
capitalist diversity in Latin America. By seeking to construct an abstract model to 
understand institutional continuities through the firm-centric lens of the VoC approach, 
two vital facets of capitalism in the region are marginalised. Firstly, even on its own terms 
the HME category does not adequately explain the behaviour of firms. To understand the 
emergence and consolidation of particular forms of industrial capitalism, as demonstrated 
by the case of Argentina, it is necessary to look beyond the national political economy. The 
nature of production in the automobile industry meant strategic decisions were not simply a 
‘default to hierarchy’, but rather had their roots in global networks of production and 
exchange. The imperatives and opportunities provided by global economic competition 
meant accumulation strategies were neither geared to maximising productive capacity nor 
to reinforcing hierarchy. Instead, it has been shown that automobile TNCs in Argentina 
were acting to maximise profits in national political economies as a means of remaining 
competitive globally. In seeking to maximise profits across the multiple levels of the global 
political economy, TNCs helped create a sector characterised by long-run fragmentation, 
high costs, and a lack of specialisation. This paper has been able to account for the failures 
of the automobile industry in Argentina by specifying the strategic decisions taken by firms 
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and emphasising the determinants of agency, both of which take us beyond a simple 
reproduction of hierarchy. 
Secondly, this paper has demonstrated that reducing workers to passive actors impacted 
upon by changes in the economy serves to conceal the contestation that occurs around 
efforts to transform and discipline their working lives (see also Bailey and Shibata in this 
special issue). Any comprehension of capitalist diversity must incorporate these struggles, 
which go on beneath the institutional framework ostensibly established between states and 
firms. In examining TNCs’ disciplining practices in automobile factories in Córdoba, it has 
been shown that workers’ struggles against them played a constitutive role in constraining 
the possibilities for this particular form of industrial capitalism. Resistance to disciplinary 
working practices provided the source of grievances that became increasingly politicised 
through the 1960s and 1970s. Initial smaller protests, and the space provided both inside and 
outside traditional union structures, enabled the coalescing of an increasingly prominent 
class identity amongst automobile workers. This identity took a historically contingent 
form, shaped distinctive outcomes beyond those actively pursued by the state and TNCs, 
and offered potential alternatives for the development of the sector. This shows that not 
only must the imperatives and incentives beyond national borders be incorporated into any 
analysis, but also the struggles of workers that contest and shape the outcomes of these 
changes from beneath. Only then can we account for the diverse and unstable nature of 
capitalism. 
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Notes 
 
1 This paper forms part of a DPhil project investigating the relationship between the working 
class and industrial development in Argentina and Chile. For the purposes of this paper 
attention is focused primarily on firm-worker relations. The role of the state in labour 
relations and industrial policy is considered elsewhere in the project.  
2 A recent non-VoC comparative capitalisms approach has emerged around the work of 
Brazilian scholars Renato Boschi and Flavio Gaitan (2009). This approach emphasises the 
importance of political institutions and the role of the state in Latin American economic 
development over the corporate strategies of firms in reproducing institutionalised 
economic activity. However, it is still problematic – see Ebenau’s paper in this special issue 
for more. 
3 Whilst this section focuses upon experiences in the industry up to 1976, there is a 
burgeoning literature on automobile production in today’s increasingly globalised political 
economy. Today, for example, the industry in Córdoba is argued to be ‘glocaldependiente’, as 
firms pursuing globally-oriented strategies force the state to develop local strategies that 
exacerbate the historical patterns of dependency described in this paper (Tomandi, 1999: 5; 
Tomandi, 2009). 
4 After 1946 Perón established the national labour federation (CGT), which remained 
strongly tied to the state, heavily centralised, and bureaucratic. It was made up of industry-
wide union federations, which negotiated contracts for their affiliated branches. The newly 
established automobile industry, however, was represented by the weaker, but more 
autonomous, mechanics and automotive workers’ union (SMATA). Despite being affiliated 
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with the CGT it was able to exercise a relative autonomy in the labour movement in 
Argentina, particularly in its regional branches (Evans et al 1984: 138-139). 
5 Important left-wing political currents emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in 
Córdoba. Clandestine Trotskyist political parties as well as leftist Perónist student and 
worker movements were increasingly prominent. Famous examples include the CGTA (a 
leftist Perónist labour federation established to counter the CGT and headed by Raimundo 
Ongaro), the clasista unions at SITRAC-SITRAM, and the clasista SMATA based at the IKA-
Renault plant in Córdoba after 1972, headed by Rene Salamanca, a member of the Trotskyist 
Partido Comunista Revolucionario. 
6 The cordobazo and viborazo were interconnected but distinct uprisings that occurred in 
Córdoba in 1969 and 1971. The former was primarily a trade union-led mobilisation triggered 
by dissatisfaction with the political and economic regime, whilst the latter, inspired by the 
events of the former, was led by those sectors of the radical left that would later become part 
of the armed guerrilla movements of the late 1970s. 
